Étiqueté : Japan

Japanese Political Economy Revisited: Abenomics and Institutional Change

This special issue starts with a short summary of the changing perceptions of Japan’s political economy from its meteoric rise as worldwide leading model in the 1970s and 1980s to its demotion to a problem and reform case since the later 1990s. Based on this overview, it identifies some striking issue and open questions in this conventional view of Japan’s political economy as problem and the high expectations on Abenomics as Japan’s current economic reform programme. Then we discuss the articles of the special issue and their new contributions to a better understanding of the developments at the corporate level as well as institutional change and economic reforms at the macro level in the last two decades.

Discussion Paper Series 2017 #04: « Understanding Corporate Responsibility in Japanese Capitalism: Some Comparative Observations »

By Gregory Jackson and Julia Bartosch. This paper discusses cross-country patterns of corporate responsibility with an interface to the discussion of a variety of capitalisms, and how corporate responsibility mirrors or substitutes for institutionalized forms of coordination.

Discussion Paper Series 2016 #06 : «The Evolution of the Ict Start-Up Eco-System in Japan: From Corporate Logic to Venture Logic?»

This paper uses the notion of institutional logics to advance our understanding of institutional change in the ICT start-up eco-system in Japan. We chose to study ICT start-ups because the rates of entry, growth, and exit are faster in this sector than in others, making it easier to observe institutional change.

Discussion Paper Series 2016 #05 : « The impact of changes in Japanese tender offer regulations on bidder behavior and shareholder gains »

Japanese regulators have undertaken several adjustments to the rules governing the market for corporate control beginning with the 1990 introduction of mandatory bid rules (MBR) for tender offers. However, the adoption of an MBR alone did not initially contribute to an active tender offer market, nor did it adequately protect targets’ minority shareholders.