This paper examines the data of listed firms in Japan, and explores the impact of institutional change on organisational diversity in terms of gender diversity on boards. In particular, it focuses on analysing the institutional pressure which Japan has been recently undergoing: financialisation and incremental regulatory reform.
Étiqueté : Japan
Discussion Paper Series 2018 #01: Organization of Value Creation and Work in the Japanese Wind Power Industry: Studying Organizational Diversity in Face of Institutional Change
By Manuel Nicklich & Jörg Sydow. The Fukushima disaster of 2011 has changed the perspective on renewable energies, not least in Japan.
Seminar at the SOAS Japan Research Centre, SOAS Department of Economics and Japan Economy Network.
This paper analyses the revival of industrial policies from the late 2000 s in Japan and Korea and their limitations.
The dynamics of urban degrowth in Japanese metropolitan areas: what are the outcomes of urban recentralisation strategies?
By Sophie Buhnik.
Japanese authorities have supported compact city-oriented policies since the late 1990s to counter the effects of population decline and lingering economic stagnation. The concentration of renewal projects in well-connected neighbourhoods is meant to sustain the mobilities of an ageing society.
An analysis of 2017 Japanese election by Yves Tiberghien. « On September 25, 2017, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe rolled the dice and called a general election on October 22, a full year ahead of schedule. When the results were announced on the night of October 22, they were rife with paradox. Three core outcomes stand out. »
This special issue starts with a short summary of the changing perceptions of Japan’s political economy from its meteoric rise as worldwide leading model in the 1970s and 1980s to its demotion to a problem and reform case since the later 1990s. Based on this overview, it identifies some striking issue and open questions in this conventional view of Japan’s political economy as problem and the high expectations on Abenomics as Japan’s current economic reform programme. Then we discuss the articles of the special issue and their new contributions to a better understanding of the developments at the corporate level as well as institutional change and economic reforms at the macro level in the last two decades.
Steven Vogel (University of California, Berkeley), visiting professor at the EHESS, will give a series of lectures entitled « Marketcraft » in June 2017.
Discussion Paper Series 2017 #04: « Understanding Corporate Responsibility in Japanese Capitalism: Some Comparative Observations »
By Gregory Jackson and Julia Bartosch. This paper discusses cross-country patterns of corporate responsibility with an interface to the discussion of a variety of capitalisms, and how corporate responsibility mirrors or substitutes for institutionalized forms of coordination.
« Japanese political economy revisited: diverse corporate change, institutional transformation, and Abenomics »
By David Chiavacci and Sébastien Lechevalier, in Japan Forum (2017).
« Understanding institutional change in Asia: A comparative perspective with Europe », 15-17 September, 2016, Tokyo
Abenomics initially generated high expectations, but the mood has currently shifted to present it as another failed economic experiment. Opinions on Abenomics are however often closed to caricatures. It is thus crucial to provide a critical and balanced evaluation.
Discussion Paper Series 2016 #06 : «The Evolution of the Ict Start-Up Eco-System in Japan: From Corporate Logic to Venture Logic?»
This paper uses the notion of institutional logics to advance our understanding of institutional change in the ICT start-up eco-system in Japan. We chose to study ICT start-ups because the rates of entry, growth, and exit are faster in this sector than in others, making it easier to observe institutional change.
Discussion Paper Series 2016 #05 : « The impact of changes in Japanese tender offer regulations on bidder behavior and shareholder gains »
Japanese regulators have undertaken several adjustments to the rules governing the market for corporate control beginning with the 1990 introduction of mandatory bid rules (MBR) for tender offers. However, the adoption of an MBR alone did not initially contribute to an active tender offer market, nor did it adequately protect targets’ minority shareholders.